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Abstract 
 
Some writers have predicted that new technologies mean the ‘death of distance’, allowing suitably 
skilled economies to converge with high income countries.  This paper evaluates this claim.  It argues 
that geography matters for international income inequalities, and that new technologies will change, 
but not abolish this dependence.  Some activities may become more entrenched in high income 
countries than they are at present.  Others - where information can be readily codified and digitized - 
will relocate, but typically only to a subset of lower income countries.  These countries will benefit, 
but other countries will continue to experience the costs of remoteness. 
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11.  Introduction
New communications and information technologies (ICT) offer many benefits to developing
countries.  Costs of establishing communications networks have been slashed, and with that
comes the prospect of better provision of education, health care, and a host of other services. 
Some writers go further, arguing that ICT offers the ‘death of distance’.  In the words of
Frances Cairncross (2001), p16,
‘To allow communications to work their magic, poor countries will need sound
regulations, open markets, and, above all, widely available education.  Where
these are available, countries with good communications will be
indistinguishable.  They will all have access to services of world class quality.
They will be able to join a world club of traders, electronically linked, and to
operate as though geography has no meaning.  This equality of access will be one
of the great prizes of the death of distance.’
The objective of this paper is to evaluate this claim.  At present, we shall argue in this paper,
geography matters a great deal for economic interaction and for the spatial distribution of
income.  How will new technologies change this, and what will they do for the location of
economic activity and for international inequalities?  What are the prospects that ICT will
lead to the death of distance?
The conceptual framework for addressing this question is based on the profitability of
production in different countries, knowing that a change that increases profitability will tend
to attract firms and bid up wage rates.  The profitability of a location is determined by many
forces: labour costs and efficiencies, the social infrastructure of the economy, and also
geography -- location relative to sources of supply and relative to markets.  The fact that firms
tend to locate close to their markets creates a force for international inequality.  Established
economic centres offer large markets, attracting firms and hence supporting high wages --
which in turn supports the large market size.  Pulling in the opposite direction are
international wage differentials (or primary factor costs more generally).  Obviously, the
lower are primary factor prices, other things being equal, the more profitable is production in
the country, a force for international equality.
The trade-off between these forces provides a simple relationship between costs of
2distance and international inequalities.  We will show in section 2 that there are international
wage gradients, with wages falling as a function of remoteness from markets.  In so far as
new technologies reduce the costs of distance they might be expected to flatten these
gradients and reduce international inequalities.  If trade were to become perfectly free -- the
limiting case of textbook international economics -- distance would be dead, goods markets
perfectly integrated and factor price equalisation would hold.  Perfectly free international
trade means that similar factors get paid the same price, regardless of their location, although
per capita income levels may differ as individuals own different amounts of human and
physical capital.  
This view of the effects of ICT is misleading, for at least two reasons.  First, new
technologies will have a mixed and complex effect on the costs of distance.  Some activities
can be digitized and supplied from a distance, but most cannot.  Second, geography
determines firms’ profitability not only via ease of access of markets, but also via access to a
cluster of related activities.  The propensity of economic activity to cluster is widely
documented (for example Porter 1990), and attributed to a range of different forces.  One is
the development of dense local networks of suppliers of specialised goods and services for
industry.  A second is development of local labour markets with specialist skills, probably
arising because of the training activities of other firms in the industry.  A third is the benefit
of being close to research centres and to the knowledge spillovers that firms derive from
proximity to other firms: ‘the mysteries of the trade become no mystery; but are, as it were, in
the air’ (Marshall 1890).  Finally, it may simply be easier to manage and monitor activities in
an established centre where firms have local knowledge and can benchmark their
performance on that of other firms in the same location.
How does new technology change these clustering forces?  Some are likely to be
weakened by ICT.  For example, proximity may come to matter less for the flow of
knowledge between firms and for the supply of business services (at least, to the extent that
the relevant knowledge can be codified and digitized).  But other clustering forces – such as
those arising from labour market skills -- are likely to be unaffected.  The overall effects of
ICT on location and international inequalities must therefore take into account the fact that
distance may die for some of the functions involved in some industries, while remaining
important for many other functions and activities.  Thus, some activities will no longer need
3to be close to consumers and will go in search of lower cost locations, but low costs depend
on wages, social infrastructure, and access to the benefits of a cluster of related activities. 
Consequently some activities may tend to move to lower wage countries, while others
become more deeply entrenched in high wage economies.
These effects are illustrated by the experience of previous communications
revolutions.  The transport revolutions of the nineteenth century did not lead to the dispersion
of economic activity, but instead to its concentration – in relatively few countries, and within
those countries in large and often highly specialised cities.  Lower transport costs reduced the
value of being close to consumers who could instead be supplied from cities in which
production exploited the advantages of increasing returns to scale and agglomeration
externalities.  So too with new technologies, we might expect to see changes in economic
geography of the world economy, but not necessarily changes towards the ‘integrated
equilibrium’ view of the death of distance.
The remainder of the paper develops the argument in three main stages.  First, we
show that geography matters greatly for many economic interactions; these interactions – be
they trade, investment, or knowledge transfers – are overwhelmingly local, falling off sharply
with distance.  We also argue that the costs that cause interactions to fall off across space
have major implications for the world income distribution.  Using measures of distance based
on the intensity of economic interaction between countries we show that distance can account
for a large part of international inequalities.  Poor countries are poor, in part, because distance
inhibits their access to the markets and suppliers of established economic centres.
We then turn to the effects of information and communications technologies (ICT) on
the costs of international transactions.  To do this requires that we look more deeply at why
distance is costly, and we divide these costs into four main elements.  Search costs (the costs
of identifying a potential trading partner).  Direct shipping costs.  Control and management
costs.  And finally, the cost of time involved in shipping to and communicating with distant
locations.  ICT reduces some of these costs for some activities, but we argue that its effects
are ambiguous, and can in some cases increase the value of proximity, rather than reduce it.
Finally, we turn to the likely effects of these cost changes on the location of activity
and hence on wages and income levels.  Will existing centres of economic activity
deconcentrate, with activities relocating to lower wage economies?  This will occur for some
4activities, but for others the concentration in central regions may well be reinforced. 
Furthermore, activities that do relocate will tend to cluster in relatively few new locations. 
Thus, new technologies may change the pattern of inequalities in the world economy, but not
necessarily reduce them.  In this way it may be like previous rounds of infrastructure
development, such as canals, railways and road networks, that permitted deagglomeration of
some industrial activities, but probably reinforced rather than diminished centralising
tendencies (Leamer and Storper, 2000).
2.  Does distance matter? 
2.1  Distance and economic interactions. 
Almost all economic interactions fall off very rapidly with distance.  We look at some of the
reasons for this later, but first simply outline the facts.  The standard framework for
quantifying the effect of distance on economic interactions is the gravity model, which relates
interactions between a pair of countries to their economic mass and to a measure of the cost
of the interaction between them.  This framework has been applied in a number of different
contexts, most of all to trade flows.  Thus, if yij is the value of exports from country i to
country j, then the gravity relationship takes the form,
(1)yij ö si mj t
9
ij
where si denotes exporter (supplier) country characteristics, mj denotes importer country
characteristics, and tij is a set of ‘between-country’ factors measuring the costs of trade
between the countries.  This between-country term is typically proxied by distance, and
perhaps also by further between-country characteristics such as sharing a common border, a
common language, history, or treaty relationship.  Exporter and importer country
characteristics can be modelled in detail, including income, area, population, and
geographical features such as being landlocked.  However, if the researcher’s main interest is
the between-country term, tij, then si and mj can simply take the form of dummy variables
whose values are estimated for each country.
Extensive data permits the gravity trade model to be estimated on the bilateral trade
flows of one hundred or more countries.  Studies find that the elasticity of trade flows with
5respect to distance is around -0.9 to -1.5.  It is important to realise quite how steep the decline
in trade volumes implied by this relationship is.  Table 1 expresses trade volumes at different
distances, relative to their value at 1000km; if 9 = -1.25, then by 4000km volumes are down
by 82% and by 8000km down by 93%. 
Similar methodologies have been used to study other sorts of economic interactions.
Portes and Rey (1999) study cross-border equity transactions (using data for 14 countries
accounting for around 87% of global equity market capitalisation, 1989-96).  Their main
measure of country mass is stock market capitalisation, and their baseline specification gives
an elasticity of transactions with respect to distance of -0.85.  This indicates again how –
controlling for the characteristics of the countries – distance matters.  Other authors have
studied foreign direct investment flows.  Data limitations mean that the set of countries is
once again quite small, and the estimated gravity coefficient is smaller, although still highly
significant; for example, Di Mauro, (2000) finds an elasticity of FDI flows with respect to
distance of -0.42.  The effect of distance on technology flows has been studied by Keller
(2001) who looks at the dependence of total factor productivity (TFP) on R&D stocks (i.e.
cumulated R&D expenditures), for 12 industries in the G-7 countries, 1971-95.  The R&D
stocks include both the own country stock, and foreign country stocks weighted by distance.1 
Both own and foreign country stocks are significant determinants of each countries’ TFP and
so too is the distance effect, with R&D stocks in distant economies having much weaker
effects on TFP than do R&D stocks in closer economies.  The final column in table 1
illustrates his results by computing the spillover effects of R&D in more distant economies
relative to an economy 1000km away; the attenuation due to distance is once again dramatic.2 
6Table 1: Economic interactions and distance.  
(Flows relative to their magnitude at 1000km)
Trade 
(9 = -1.25)
Equity flows
 (9 = -0.85)
FDI 
(9 = -0.42)
Technology
1000km 1 1 1 1
2000km 0.42 0.55 0.75 0.65
4000km 0.18 0.31 0.56 0.28
8000km 0.07 0.17 0.42 0.05
2.2.  Distance and real income.   
The previous sub-section made the point that distance matters greatly for economic
interactions.  How does this feed into the distribution of income across countries?  A number
of mechanisms might be at work, including the effects of investment flows and technology
transfers.  Here, to illustrate effects, we concentrate just on the way in which trade flows –
and the implicit trade costs demonstrated by the gravity model – can generate international
income gradients.  
The effect of distance on factor prices is easily seen through a simple example. 
Suppose that country 1 represents the high income countries, from which country 2, a
developing country, imports intermediate goods and to which it exports manufactures.  The
cost of producing manufactures in country 1 is given by  where w1 and r1 are thec(w1,r1,q)
unit costs of labour and capital and q the cost of intermediate goods.3  The developing country
has to import the intermediate good, and imports are subject to ‘trade costs’ at proportionate
rate t.4  These ‘trade costs’ consist of a number of different elements that we discuss in detail
in section 3.  Trade costs at rate t mean that the price of intermediates in country 2 is tq, so
country 2 units costs are , given its factor prices, w2 and r2.5  It sells in thec(w2,r2, tq)
developed country market, but faces trade cost factor t in shipping to this market.  In order to
compete with production in country 1, the following equation must therefore hold
(2)c(w1,r1,q) ö t c(w2,r2, tq) .
Figure 1 illustrates country 2 wages (expressed as a proportion of country 1 wages) as a
7function of trade costs, computed from this relationship with the assumption that r2 = r1.  It
can be thought of as illustrating the wage gradient for different countries at increasing
distances (increasing trade costs) from the centre.  In all cases illustrated two thirds of value
added is labour and one third capital.  In the upper line there are no intermediate goods, while
in the middle line intermediates account for 25% of country 1 costs, and in the bottom line
50% of country 1 costs.  The point to note from the figure is how rapidly wages get squeezed
at more remote locations with higher trade costs.  Thus if trade costs are 30% of the value of
output (t = 1.3) and intermediate inputs are 50% of costs (bottom curve) then wages drop to
around one tenth of their level in the centre.  Trade costs of 30% are not that high (the median
cif/fob ratio for all countries reporting bilateral trade is 1.28).  Furthermore, if the price of
capital were higher in more remote locations (r2 > r1) then wages would be depressed still
further.
Figure 1 suggests the theoretical importance of distance for international inequalities. 
To establish the importance of this relationship in fact we must generalise it to many
countries and to the full set of trade relationships between them.  Instead of simple measures
of transport costs we define the ‘market-access’ of country i, .  Recall that mjMAi ö Mj mjt 9ij
measures the economic mass of an importer country, and  the rate at which its effect fallst 9ij
off with distance.  MAi is therefore a measure of country i’s access to demand from all
countries.  It provides a generalisation of the old idea of ‘market potential’ (Harris 1954),
which takes GDP as economic mass and the reciprocal of distance as the measure of spatial
decay.  Analogously, we define the ‘supplier-access’ of country i as .  sjSAi ö Mj sjt 9ij
represents economic characteristics of exporting countries, such as manufacturing output, and
we can use SAi to measure country i’s access to suppliers of intermediate goods.  Thus, a high
value of SAi means that country i is close to exporting countries so has relatively cheap access
to intermediate goods.
Using these concepts we can now express the rate of return to production in country i
as a function of the wage in the country and its market and supplier access:
(3)ri ö R wi,Mj mjt 9ij ,Mj sjt 9ij ö R wi, MAi, SAi
Suppose that economic activity locates in a manner that equalises the rate of return across
8countries.  Equations (3) then form a set of equations linking each country’s wage to its
market and supplier access, so generates an estimating equation of the form,
(4)wi ö . ø 31 MAi ø 32 SAi ø ui .
The final term, ui, is an error term to which we assign, for the moment, all other influences on
wages.  Redding and Venables (2000) estimate this relationship using a cross-section of data
on 101 developed and developing countries.6  A two-stage procedure is followed.  At the first
stage a gravity trade model (equation 1) is estimated to give estimates of mj, si and 9, from
which measures of market-access and supplier-access can be constructed for each country. 
The full specification of market-access and supplier-access requires that each country’s own
market (and supply) is included, as well as the effect of all foreign markets (suppliers).  In
this paper we discuss only the foreign market (foreign supplier) effects, so work with foreign
market-access and foreign supplier-access, defined as  andFMAi ö Mjg i mjt 9ij
;  Redding and Venables deal with the full case. FSAi ö Mjg i sjt 9ij
At the second stage, equation (4) is econometrically estimated.  Before looking at
regression results it is instructive to look at the scatter plot given in Figure 2.  The horizontal
axis is log of foreign market access (FMA), and the vertical axis gives the log of GDP per
capita, used as a proxy for manufacturing wages.7  The figure presents evidence of the
importance of market-access in determining wages – the empirical analogue of figure 1. 
Clearly, there is a strong positive association between FMA and per capita income.  There are
outliers such as Australia, New Zealand, Japan, the USA, Singapore and Hong Kong.  For
two of these, this is explicable in terms of their own size: the sheer population mass of the US
and Japan mean that domestic market and supplier access are extremely important relative to
foreign access.  Looking at the rest of the sample, the relationship holds within regions as
well as between them.  Thus, there is a European wage gradient lying from the core countries
down through Spain and Portugal (ESP and PRT) to Greece (GRC).  There is an East
European gradient, lying below the West European, indicating that these countries have lower
per capita income than their location alone would justify.  Similar gradients can be pulled out
for other regions.  
The results of using this data to estimate equation (4) are given in table 2.  Column (1)
9presents the results using foreign market-access alone.  The estimated coefficient is positive
and highly statistically significant and the variable explains about 35% of the cross-country
variation in income per capita.  Column (2) uses foreign supplier-access alone, with similar
effect.  The theoretical specification says that we should include both market-access and
supplier-access, and column (3) does this, although separately identifying the coefficients on
these two variables is difficult given the high degree of correlation between them.  However,
the theory suggests a restriction across the two coefficients based on the relative shares of
labour and intermediates in costs, and column (3) presents estimates based on the assumption
that the intermediate share of costs is 50% higher than the labour share.  Once again, results
are highly significant, with the measures explaining 36% of the variation in the cross-country
income distribution.
Of course, we do not claim that geography is the only cause of cross-country
variations in income, and the final column of Table 2 includes other variables, particularly
those used by Sachs and his coauthors8.  Endowments of hydrocarbons per capita have a
positive and significant effect, as would be expected, while the proportion of land in the
tropics is negative although insignificant.  Former socialist rule and involvement in external
wars have negative and significant effects.  Sachs has argued that Malaria can have a
pervasive productivity reducing effect, and the variable measuring the presence of Malaria (a
dummy variable taking value one in countries where Malaria is endemic) has a significant
negative and quantitatively important effect.  Together with the foreign market-access
measure these variables explain around two-thirds of the cross country variation in per capita
income.  From the current perspective, the main point is that the foreign market-access
measure remains highly significant, making the point that distance matters for per capita
income, as suggested by the theory.
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Table 2: GDP per capita, market and supplier access(a) 
ln(GDP per capita) (1)(b) (2)(b) (3)(b) (5)(b)
Obs 101 101 101 99
Year 1996 1996 1996 1996
ln(FMAi) 0.476 0.319 0.277
[0.076] [0.063]
ln(FSAi) 0.532 0.182
[0.114] [0.040]
ln(Hydrocarbons per capita) 0.026
[0.016]
Fraction Land in Geog. Tropics -0.139
[0.253]
Prevalence of Malaria -1.496
[0.268]
Socialist Rule 1950-95 -0.743
[0.156]
External War 1960-85 -0.344
[0.170]
Estimation OLS OLS OLS OLS
R2 0.346 0.377 0.361 0.671
F(#) 52.76 57.05 54.60 55.63
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: (a) first stage estimation of the trade equation using Tobit (column (3) in Table 1).
(b)
 Bootstrapped standard errors in square parentheses (200 replications).
3.  What determines distance costs and how are they changing?
We argued above that geography is an important determinant of per capita income.  Despite
the presence of large cross-country wage differences it is not profitable for firms to relocate,
moving away from markets and suppliers.  We now look in more detail at the determinants of
the costs of distance and at the effects of new technologies on these costs.  This can best be
addressed through the following thought experiment.  A firm is considering where to source
its supplies from, or where to locate its own production.  How is the decision to outsource to
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a low wage economy deterred by distance, and how might ICT mitigate this deterrent effect?
We divide the distance effects into four main elements.  First, making any sort of
trade involves finding a trading partner, a process of search and matching which turns on the
availability of information.  Second, inputs and outputs have to be transported.  We show
how these depend on country and commodity characteristics and present some evidence on
how they are changing; in ‘weightless’ activities new technologies set these costs essentially
at zero, but we argue that such activities amount to only a few percent of total expenditure. 
Third, the supply chain has to be managed; for outsourced supply this involves a process of
information exchange and monitoring, and for own investment it involves management of the
entire project.  The final component of the costs of distance is time.  New technologies often
speed up aspects of the production and management process, but we argue that this might
either increase or decrease the benefits of proximity and costs of distance. 
3.1  Searching and matching
A major reason why transactions fall off with distance is that we simply know less about what
potential trades can be made with people on the other side of the earth than we do about
potential trades with our neighbours.  Relatively little is known about the magnitude of these
information barriers, although attempts to establish their existence have been made by a
number of researchers.  For example, Rauch and Trindada (1999) use a gravity trade model to
show how ethnic Chinese networks seem to increase trade volumes.
It seems likely that new technologies -- the internet in particular -- significantly reduce
search and matching costs.  The internet means that distance ceases to be important in
advertising (by either suppliers and purchasers) and business-to-business exchanges facilitate
search and matching across space.  From my desktop a search engine will produce ‘about
10,300’  matches for the search string garment+export+china+ltd, at least the first ten of
which are trading houses or Chinese firms offering supply.  The most heavily researched
examples of searching and matching through the internet have a national rather than
international focus.  For example, in the US automobile market in 1999 more than 40% of
buyers used the internet to seek out price and model information -- although only 3% of sales
were made on the internet.9  This example makes a point which many dotcom companies
have discovered, and which is surely even more true in an international context.  The internet
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is excellent for acquiring information, but information is a necessary but by no means a
sufficient condition for completing a trade.  
3.2 Moving inputs and outputs 
An international transaction requires that outputs and traded inputs be moved across space. 
This can be done by different modes -- surface, air, or for some activities, digitally.  How
large are these costs, and in what ways -- and for how large a share of trade -- do we expect
new technologies to reduce them?
Data on shipping costs indicates that there is a very wide dispersion of transport costs
across commodities and across countries.  Thus, for the US in 1994, freight expenditure was
only 3.8% of the value of imports, but equivalent numbers for Brazil and Paraguay are 7.3%
and 13.3% (Hummels 1999a, from customs data).  These values incorporate the fact that most
trade is with countries that are close, and in goods that have relatively low transport costs. 
Looking at transport costs unweighted by trade volumes gives much higher numbers; thus,
the median cif/fob ratio, across all country pairs for which data is available, is 1.28 (implying
28% transport and insurance costs).  Looking across commodities, an unweighted average of
freight rates is typically 2 to 3 times higher than the trade weighted average rate.  
Estimates of the determinants of transport costs are given in Hummels (1999b) and
Limao and Venables (2001).  These studies typically find elasticities of transport costs with
respect to distance of between 0.2 and 0.3.  Limao and Venables find that sharing a common
border substantially reduces transport costs, overland distance is around 7 times more
expensive than sea distance, and being landlocked increases transport costs by approximately
50%.  Infrastructure quality (as measured by a composite of index of transport and
communications networks) is important; for example, while the median cif/fob ratio is 1.28,
the predicted value of this ratio for a pair of countries with infrastructure quality at the 75th
percentile rises to 1.40.
How are transport costs changing through time?  Figure 3 documents the evolution of
the costs of ocean shipping, air freight, and transmission of digitized information.  There are
three main points to notice.  First, the costs of sea transport declined during the 1940s and
50s, but since then there has been no trend decline, although there have been substantial
fluctuations driven largely by oil prices.  This seems superficially surprising, but less so when
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one sees that the variable reported is the shipping cost relative to a goods price index.  Thus,
there has been technical progress in shipping, but it has been no faster than the average in the
rest of the economy.  Second, the cost of airfreight fell more and continued to fall for a longer
period, but this too has essentially bottomed out from the 1980s onwards.  The third series is
a measure of the cost of transmitting digitized information.  Evidently, this has experienced
the most dramatic fall, and can now be regarded as being close to zero.  From the standpoint
of investigating international inequalities the important question is: what share of world
expenditure is now ‘weightless’ and can be digitized and transmitted at close to zero cost?
This question is very hard to answer, because it is typically particular economic
functions that can be digitized, rather than whole production sectors that are the basis for data
collection.  There are numerous examples of activities that have been digitized and relocated. 
Airline ticketing services and the back-room operations of banks are standard ones.  Call
centres, transcription of medical notes, architectural drawings, and cartoons and computer
graphics for the film industry are further possibilities.
One way to try and get a quantitative estimate is to look sectorally, in which case the
numbers look rather small.  Figures are available for US household consumption of ICT-
based products and services.  By 1998 50 per cent of Americans already had a personal
computer and 30 per cent were regular Internet users.  But total consumption of ICT-based
products and services, including voice telephony, was only 2.4 per cent of consumer
expenditure, of which a very large part is ultimately devoted to upkeep of the network, a
largely non-tradeable activity (Turner, 2001).  On the supply side, the US Bureau of Labor
Statistics foresee ICT industry employment growing from 3.7 per cent of the US total in 1998
to 4.9 per cent in 2008, with the increase concentrated almost entirely in computer processing
and software services (Turner, 2001).  The OECD estimates that all software and computer
related services accounted to 2.7 per cent of US GDP in 1996, and half that in other OECD
countries studied.  Software products and computer services combined accounted for just 0.8
per cent of US exports in 1996 (OECD 1998).
Other sectors contain functions that are ‘IT enabled’.  In banking it is estimated that
some 17-24 per cent of the cost base of banks can be outsourced, (Economist May 5th 2001), a
share that seems quite low for an activity that is fundamentally weightless.  
Another way to get a feel for the magnitude of these activities is to look at the recent
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experience of the highly successful Indian software and IT-enabled services sectors.  The total
output of software and related services in 2000 was around $8bill with exports of $4bill.  IT
enabled services – call centres (‘customer interaction centres’), medical transcriptions,
finance and accounting services – had exports to the US of $0.26bill, predicted to grow to
$4bill by 2005 (Economist May 5th 2001).  These are substantial size activities, compared to
total Indian exports of $45bill in 2000, but are less than 1 per cent of total US imports of
around $950billion.  
Although it is difficult to quantify the share of the economy that is, or is likely to
become, weightless, one fundamental point can be made.  As activities are codified and
digitized, so not only can they be moved costlessly through space, but also they are typically
subject to very large productivity increases and price reductions.  Thus, the effect of ICT on,
say, airline ticketing, has been primarily to replace labour by computer equipment, and only
secondarily to allow remaining workers to be employed in India rather than the US or Europe.
(Technology that can capture voice or handwriting will make Indian medical transcription
obsolete).  This suggests that even if more activities become weightless the share of world
expenditure and employment attributable to these activities will remain small -- perhaps as
little as a few percent of world GDP.
3.3  Monitoring and management
Recent years have seen rapid growth of both outsourcing and foreign direct investment (FDI),
with the associated development of production networks or production chains.10  FDI has
grown faster than either income or trade.  The growth of production networks has been
studied by a number of researchers.  One way to measure its growth is by looking at trade in
components, and Yeats (1998) estimates that 30% of world trade in manufactures is trade in
components rather than final products.  Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001) chart trade flows that
cross borders multiple times, as when a country imports a component and then re-exports it
embodied in some downstream product.  They find that (for 10 OECD countries), the share of
imported value added in exports rose by one third between 1970 and 1990, reaching 21% of
export value.  
Both FDI and outsourcing involve, in somewhat different ways, a fragmentation of the
structure of the firm, as production is split into geographically and/or organisationally
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different units.  From the international perspective this fragmentation offers the benefits of
being able to move particular stages of the production process to the lowest cost locations –
labour intensive parts to low wage economies, and so on.  However, as well as involving
potentially costly shipping of parts and components it also creates formidable management
challenges.  Product specification and other information has to be transferred, and production
schedules and quality standards have to be monitored.  Do new technologies reduce the costs
of doing this?
To the extent that pertinent information is ‘codifiable’ the answer is likely to be yes. 
The use of ICT for business-to-business trade is well documented, although this is reported to
often reduce the number of suppliers a firm uses, rather than increase it.11  In mass production
of standardized products designs can be relatively easily codified; the production process is
routine, daily or hourly production runs can be reported and quality data can be monitored. 
Dell Computers offers the classic example of the use of new technologies to outsource to
order, getting components from suppliers at short notice.  However, it is instructive that
Dell’s business practises, while held up as a model, has not been widely emulated (Economist
April 12th 2001).  It works because PCs are made almost entirely from standard parts,
available from many sources; there is no need to order special components in advance and
consumer customization of PCs is within very narrow limits -- speed and memory, but not
colour or trim.  The product range and set of options is vastly less complex than a motor car.
In many activities then, the pertinent information cannot be codified so easily.  There
are two sorts of reasons for this.  One is the inherent complexity of the activity.  For example,
frequent design changes and a process of ongoing product design and improvement
(involving both marketing and production engineering) may require a level of interaction that
-- to date -- can only be achieved by face-to-face contact.
The second reason is to do with the fact that contracts are incomplete, and people on
either side of the contract (or in different positions within a single firm) have their own
objectives.  It is typically expensive or impossible to ensure that their incentives can be
shaped to be compatible with meeting the objectives of the firm.  This issue has been the
subject of a large economics literature.  Part of the literature has its origins in analysis of the
boundaries of the firm (Coase, 1937), asking what transactions are best done within the firm,
and what by the market.  Following Williamson (1975, 1985) this is typically modelled as a
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trade-off between efficiency gains of using specialist suppliers (or suppliers in locations with
a comparative advantage or low labour costs) and the problems encountered in writing
(enforceable) contracts with them. Another part of the literature looks at the problems of
incentives in organisations, asking how employees can be induced to meet their firm’s
objectives.12 
While new technologies may reduce the costs of monitoring, it seems unlikely that
these problems of incomplete contracts are amenable to a technological fix.  What evidence is
there?  On the one hand, there is the fact that in recent years there has been a dramatic
increase in the outsourcing of activities to specialist suppliers, suggesting that difficulties in
writing contracts and monitoring performance have been reduced.  On the other hand, a
number of empirical studies point to the continuing importance, despite new technologies, of
regular face-to-face contact.  Thus, Gaspar and Glaeser (1998) argue that telephones are likely
to be complements, not substitutes, for face-to-face contact as they increase the overall
amount of business interaction.  They suggest that, as a consequence, telephones have
historically promoted the development of cities.  The evidence on business travel suggests
that as electronic communications have increased so too has travel, again indicating the
importance of face-to-face contact.  Leamer and Storper (2000) draw the distinction between
‘conversational’ transactions (that can be done at a distance by ICT) and ‘handshake’
transactions that require face-to-face contact.  New technologies allow dispersion of activities
that only require ‘conversational’ transactions, but might also increase the complexity of
production and design process, and hence increase the proportion of activities that require
‘handshake’ communication.  
Overall then, it seems that there are some relatively straightforward activities where
knowledge can be codified, new technologies will make management from a distance easier,
and relocation of the activity to lower wage regions might be expected.  But monitoring,
control, and information exchange in more complex activities still requires a degree of
contact that involves proximity and face-to-face meetings.  Perhaps nowhere is this more
evident than in design and development of the new technologies themselves.
3.4  The costs of time in transit
We now turn to the final element of shipping costs -- the cost of time in transit.  New
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technologies provide radical opportunities for speeding up parts of the overall supply process. 
There are several ways this can occur.  One is simply that basic information -- product
specifications, orders and invoices -- can be transmitted and processed more rapidly.  Another
is that information about uncertain aspects of the supply process can be discovered and
transmitted sooner.  For example, retailers’ electronic stock control can provide
manufacturers with real time information about sales and hence about changes in fashion and
overall expenditure levels.  For intermediate goods, improved stock controls and lean
production techniques allow manufacturers to detect and identify defects in supplies more
rapidly.  These changes pose the interesting question: if some elements of the supply process
become quicker, what does this do to the marginal value of time saved (or marginal cost of
delay) in other parts of the process?  In particular, if one part of the process that takes time is
the physical shipment of goods, then will time saving technical changes encourage firms to
move production closer to markets, or allow them to move further away?  
The importance of the costs of time in transit is highlighted by recent work by
Hummels (2000), who analyses data on some 25 million observations of shipments into the
US, some by air and some by sea (imports classified at the 10-digit commodity level by
exporter country and district of entry to the US for 25 years).  Given data on the costs of each
mode and the shipping times from different countries he is able to estimate the implicit value
of time saved by using air transport.  The numbers are quite large.  The cost of an extra day’s
travel is (from estimates on imports as a whole) around 0.3% of the value shipped.  For
manufacturing sectors, the number goes up to 0.5%, costs that are around 30 times larger than
the interest charge on the value of the goods.  One implication of these figures is that
transport costs have fallen much more through time than suggested by looking at freight
charges alone.  The share of US imports going by air freight rose from zero to 30% between
1950 to 1998, and containerization approximately doubled the speed of ocean shipping; these
giving a reduction in shipping time of 26 days, equivalent to a shipping cost reduction worth
12-13% of the value of goods traded.
Given the magnitude of these costs, how might a time-saving technology influence the
location of production?  To answer this question it is worth writing down a very simple
economic model.  Production of a good can take place in one of many locations, and the
distance of each of these locations from the place where the product is sold is /.  Production
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requires one unit of labour, so has unit cost equal to the wage.  Wages are lower in more
remote locations – for the reasons outlined in section 2.2 above – and we write this
relationship w(/), where w’(/) < 0, (as in figure 1).  The full supply process and delivery to
market takes time T(/, z), which is increasing in distance to market and in a technology
parameter, z, so T/(/, z) > 0 and Tz(/, z) > 0, where a subscript denotes a partial derivative. 
The proportion of earnings lost due to delay is 3(T ), 3’(T ) > 0.  Thus, if the price is p, profits
per unit are,
(5) ö p 1 ÷ 3 T(/, z) ÷ w(/).
Firms choose where to produce, trading off the loss of earnings due to delay against the lower
wages they have to pay in more remote regions.  The profit maximising choice of / is
characterised by first order condition,
(6)/ ö ÷p3ô T(/, z) T/(/, z) ÷ w ô(/) ö 0.
The final term is the lower wage costs from moving to a more remote location, and the first
term is the effect of this extra distance on time, T/(/, z), times the marginal cost of delay, p3’.
Suppose that there is a technological change, dz, that directly reduces the time taken in
the supply process.  We want to know whether this technical change induces firms to move
closer to the centre or further way.  Totally differentiating the first order condition for
location choice gives
(7)//
3ôT/Tz
d/
dz
ö
3ôô
3ô
ø
T/z
T/Tz
The term in square brackets on the left hand side is negative (// must be negative as the
second order condition for profit maximisation) so a time saving technical change causes
production to move towards the centre (d//dz positive) if the right hand side is negative.  We
look at the two terms on the right hand side in turn.
The first term, 3”/3’, measures how the marginal cost of time changes as T increases. 
The case where this is negative is illustrated by the solid (concave) curve in figure 4.  In this
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case a technical improvement which reduces T increases the marginal value of a further
reduction in T, so will encourage firms to move production closer to the centre.  This is in
fact the normal case that arises because of discounting (at rate r, so 3 = 1 - exp(- rT )). 
In addition to discounting there are other reasons to believe that 3”/3’ is negative.  For
example, suppose that the firm produces a fashion sensitive product, and under the old retail
stock-control technology it was impossible to detect consumer response to this season’s
fashion until after it was too late to change production for this season.  The firm produced all
its stock in advance but expected to have to discount them by factor %; thus, the cost of delay
is that instead of receiving price p per unit, it receives only p[1 - %] (the dashed horizontal
line on figure 4).  Under the new retail stock-control technology the firm can learn about
fashion instantaneously, redesign, and sell without discounting.  However, if production and
shipping takes T and the length of the season is T0 (with sales occurring at a constant rate
during the season) then the cost of time is 3(T ) = %
 
T
 
/T0, given by the dashed line between 0
and T0.  The shorter is T the higher the proportion of the season in which the firm does not
have to discount.  (So for example, if T =T0/2 then ½ of the sales are discounted, and the
average receipts are p[1 - %/2]).  The dashed line corresponds to a case where 3”/3’ < 0, so
the firm moves production closer to the market to exploit the advantage of the more rapid
market information.13  
An example of this is the highly successful Spanish clothing chain, Zara (Economist,
May 19th 2001).  It uses real time sales data, can make a new product line in three weeks
(compared to the industry average of nine months) and only commits 15% of production at
the start of the season (industry average 60%).  It also does almost all its manufacturing
(starting with basic fabric dyeing through the full manufacturing process) in house in Spain,
with most of the sewing done by 400 local cooperatives (compared to the extensive
outsourcing of other firms in the industry).  Other examples could arise in intermediate goods
supply, where instead of making it quicker to detect new fashions, new technology might
make it easier to detect faults; the supplier would then want to move production closer and
cut delivery times so that fewer faulty items were in the delivery chain.
Returning to the model, the second term in equation (7) gives a quite different reason
why firms may relocate their production, arising because of direct complementarity between
technology and distance in the journey time.  This is best understood through a few examples. 
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Suppose that T depends on activities that happen in sequence – say transmitting information,
followed by production and shipping -- and that the technical change only affects the first of
these.  Since activities are in sequence, the total time is the sum of the parts, T(/, z) = T
 
z(z) +
T
 
/(/), where the first term is the time of information transmission, and the second the time in
shipping.  In this case there is no interaction between the technical change and the time taken
in shipping, so T/z is zero.  Conversely, suppose that the processes are in parallel, so the time
is set by the slowest part of the process, i.e. T(/, z) = max[ T
 
z(z), T
 
/(/)].  Generally, we
might imagine the situation to be between these cases, and this is illustrated by the curved
iso-time line in figure 5.  Increasing the time taken in information transmission reduces the
effect of moving further out on total time taken, so T/z < 0.  In this case then, we once again
expect to see that the technical improvement encourages activity to move closer to the centre,
rather than further away.
Evidence on the phenomena outlined here comes from study of just-in-time
technologies, where new technologies have allowed much improved stock control and
ordering, and a consequent movement of suppliers towards their customers.  In a study of the
location of suppliers to the US automobile industry Klier (1999) finds that 70-80% of
suppliers are located within one days drive of the assembly plant, although even closer
location is limited by the fact that many suppliers serve several assembly plants.  He also
finds evidence that the concentration of supplier plants around assembly plants has increased
since 1980, a timing that he points out is consistent with the introduction of just-in-time
production methods.  The leader in the application of just-in-time techniques is Toyota,
whose independent suppliers are on average only 59 miles away from its assembly plants, to
which they make eight deliveries a day.  By contrast, General Motor's suppliers in North
America are an average of 427 miles away from the plants they serve and make fewer than
two deliveries a day.  As a result, Toyota and its suppliers maintain inventories that are
one-fourth of General Motor's, when measured as a percentage of sales (Fortune, Dec 8th
1997).
4.  Where will activities move?
The previous section suggests that ICT will change the costs of distance in quite different
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ways for different types of activity.  For many activities both face-to-face contact and
proximity to markets or a cluster of related activities will remain important.  These are
activities where complexity makes it difficult to codify information and write complete
contracts, where uncertainty makes rapid response to changing circumstances important, or
where transport costs remain important.  Other sorts of activities can be fully digitized (the
‘weightless’ activities) or may be sufficiently simple that information flows required in
production control and monitoring can be codified and implemented remotely. 
Activities in the former group are likely to remain spatially concentrated, and at least
two reasons suggest that their concentration might increase.  One is the existence of
complementarities in the value of time, as outlined above.  The other derives from the
possibility of spatially separating these activities from more routine parts of the supply
process.  For example, suppose that financial services require both ‘front-room’ operations
(that tend to cluster together) and ‘back-room’ operations (that are intensive in medium
skilled labour and office space).  If the front and back-room operations have to be located
together, then the overall clustering force might be quite weak – firms that are not in London,
Tokyo or New York lose out on the benefits of being in a cluster, but at least have the
benefits of cheaper labour and office space.  But once the back-room operations can be
separated from the front-room, then the agglomeration forces on the latter become
overwhelming.  All these activities will therefore be further concentrated by new
technologies.  It is therefore perhaps to be expected that financial services – in some ways a
prime example of a weightless activity – are in fact enormously concentrated in a few centres,
with no prospect of technology causing the dissolution of these centres.
What about the more routine and codifiable activities?  These now have the
possibility of moving out of established centres, but where will they go?  One possibility is
that they spread rather evenly through many locations, bringing modest increases in labour
demand in many countries.  An alternative is that relocation takes these industries to rather
few countries, and this is what we expect to see if there is some propensity for these activities
to cluster.  The propensity may be quite weak – the point is simply that as activities leave
established centres in search of lower wage locations, it is likely that a location that has some
similar activities will look more attractive than one that has none.
The effects of trade cost reductions in a world where manufacturing is internationally
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mobile but subject to some clustering forces can be illustrated by developing a variant of the
‘new economic geography’ models of Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999).  Suppose that
there are many countries, arranged in a linear world with a well defined centre and pair of
peripheries.  Each country is identical (apart from in its location) being endowed with the
same quantity of two factors of production (labour and land).  There are two production
activities, one of which we call ‘agriculture’, although it can be interpreted as a wider
aggregate of all the perfectly competitive sectors of the economy; this sector uses labour, land
and manufactures to produce a perfectly tradeable output.  The other sector is manufacturing,
in which firms operating with increasing returns to scale produce in a monopolistically
competitive market structure; these firms use labour and manufactures to produce
manufactures.
This structure has within it forward and backwards linkages, as manufacturing firms
use inputs from other manufacturing firms and supply outputs to other manufacturing firms. 
These linkages encourage agglomeration, so that typically manufacturing operates only in the
central locations, while peripheral locations are specialised in agriculture.  The wage
implications of this are illustrated on figure 6.  At an initial position with high trade costs the
low wage countries have agriculture only, as do a corresponding set of countries on the other
side of the centre (concealed in the diagram).  Wages in these countries are much lower than
those in industrialised countries, and wages peak in the central region that has the best market
access and best supplier access.
The effects of trade cost reduction can be seen by moving to the right along the figure.
At lower trade costs it becomes profitable for some firms to relocate to lower wage
economies, but (a) these are the countries that are relatively close to the centre and (b) as
these countries attract industry so a process of cumulative causation commences.  Forward
and backwards linkages between firms in the country mean that there is rapid ‘take-off’ of
these countries, as indicated by the steepness of the wage gradient.  The bold line AA 
illustrates the wage path of a country located midway between centre and edge as transport
costs fall.  This country is initially in ‘the periphery’ with no manufacturing and low wages,
but lower trade costs cause manufacturing to spread out of the centre, industrialising this
country and causing the rapid wage growth illustrated.
The point of this example is then, that even for activities that can relocate from
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established centres, the presence of (weak) agglomeration forces means that they will move to
just a subset of possible new locations.  As a consequence some countries will experience a
rapid increase in labour demand and wages, while others remain in the periphery, essentially
untouched by the process.  New technologies change the pattern of inequalities in the world
economy, but do not uniformly decrease them.
The predictions of this theoretical model seem to be broadly in line with what we
know about recent sectoral relocations.  Much software production has left the US – but to
concentrate largely in Ireland and Bangalore.  At a broader level, there has been growth of
production networks, with components production outsourced to lower wage countries, but 
this growth of vertical specialisation and parts and components trade is concentrated in a few
countries neighbouring existing centres – in Asia, Europe and America.
The growth of trade in production networks and its geographical concentration are
illustrated in Table 3, which looks at countries’ exports of telecommunications equipment
(both final equipment and parts and components), a set of commodities for which there has
been rapid growth of outsourcing to lower wage countries.  The 68 countries in the sample
are divided according to their initial (1983-85) per capita incomes, and we see (bottom row)
that the share of low income countries in world trade in telecoms equipment rose from 5% in
the early 1980s to 19% in the late 1990s.  The body of the table gives the number of countries
in each income group classified according to the share of telecoms in their exports.  The point
to note is the skewness of this distribution:  telecoms equipment production and trade has
become very important for just a few low income countries (for one country it accounts for
more than 10% of total exports, another between 6.6 and 10%) while for the vast majority it
remains unimportant.  This pattern is repeated in other sectors, generally with the same set of
countries being the main exporters.
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Table 3: Exports of telecommunications equipment, final and parts.
Number of countries classified by per capita income and share of telecoms in exports.
1983-85 1995-97
Telecoms as  % country’s
exports
low
income
mid
income
high
income
low
income
mid
income
high
income
<3.33% 36 9 14 32 7 11
3.3%-6.6% 1 1 3 3 4 5
6.6%-10% 0 2 1 1 1 2
>10% 0 0 1 1 0 1
Share of countries in all
telecoms exports
0.051 0.117 0.83 0.191 0.112 0.697
5.  Conclusions.
Speculating about the implications of new technology is a notoriously risky activity. 
However, the analysis of the paper suggests several main conclusions.  Some activities will
become more deeply entrenched in high income countries – and typically in cities in these
countries.  These activities will generally be complex – knowledge intensive, rapidly
changing, and requiring face-to-face communication.  But they will also include supply of
non-tradeables and of produced goods where shipping is costly or time consuming.  Other
activities which are more readily transportable and less dependent on face-to-face
communications may relocate to lower wage countries, and this will be an important force for
development.  However, since these activities may cluster together, development is likely to
take the form of rapid development by a small number of countries (or regions) rather than a
more uniform process of convergence.  Although new technologies facilitate the relocation of
these activities, the proportion of world GDP that can ‘operate as though geography has no
meaning’ (Cairncross 2001) is likely to be small.
New technologies will not mean the death of distance, but the contribution of these
technologies to economic development will nevertheless be important.  It will come primarily
from allowing individuals greater access to knowledge, education and basic services, not
through rewriting the rules of economic geography.
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Appendix:
Table A1: Countries in figure 2 and table 2. 
1. Albania (ALB) 28. Estonia (EST) 55. Morocco (MAR) 82. Singapore (SGP)
2. Argentina (ARG) 29. Ethiopia (ETH) 56. Moldova (MDA) 83. El Salvador (SLV)
3. Armenia (ARM) 30. Finland (FIN) 57. Madagasc. (MDG) 84. Slovak Rep. (SVK)
4. Australia (AUS) 31. France (FRA) 58. Mexico (MEX) 85. Slovenia (SVN)
5. Austria (AUT) 32. Gabon (GAB) 59. Macedonia (MKD) 86. Sweden (SWE)
6. Bangladesh (BGD) 33. UK (GBR) 60. Mongolia (MNG) 87. Syria (SYR)
7. Bulgaria (BGR) 34. Greece (GRC) 61. Mozambiq. (MOZ) 88. Chad (TCD)
8. Belg./Lux (BLX) 35. Guatemala (GTM) 62. Mauritius (MUS) 89. Thailand (THA)
9. Bolivia (BOL) 36. Hong Kong (HKG) 63. Malawi (MWI) 90. Trinidad/T. (TTO)
10. Brazil (BRA) 37. Honduras (HND) 64. Malaysia (MYS) 91. Tunisia (TUN)
11. C Afr. Rp. (CAF) 38. Croatia (HRV) 65. Nicaragua (NIC) 92. Turkey (TUR)
12. Canada (CAN) 39. Hungary (HUN) 66. Netherlands (NLD) 93. Taiwan (TWN)
13. Switzerl. (CHE),  40. Indonesia (IDN) 67. Norway (NOR) 94. Tanzania (TZA)
14. Chile (CHL) 41. India (IND) 68. Nepal (NPL) 95.Uruguay (URY)
15. China (CHN) 42. Ireland (IRL) 69. New Zeal. (NZL) 96. USA (USA)
16. Cote d'Ivoire (CIV) 43. Israel (ISR) 70. Pakistan (PAK) 97. Venezuela (VEN)
17. Cameroon (CMR) 44. Italy (ITA) 71. Panama (PAN) 98. Yemen (YEM)
18. Congo Rep. (COG) 45. Jamaica (JAM) 72. Peru (PER) 99. South Afr. (ZAF)
19. Colombia (COL) 46. Jordan (JOR) 73. Philippines (PHL) 100. Zambia (ZMB)
20. Costa Rica (CRI) 47. Japan (JPN) 74.Poland (POL) 101. Zimbabwe (ZWE)
21. Czech Rep. (CZE) 48. Kazakhstan (KAZ) 75. Portugal (PRT)
22. Germany (DEU) 49. Kenya (KEN) 76. Paraguay (PRY)
23. Denmark (DNK) 50. Kyrgyz Rp. (KGZ) 77. Romania (ROM)
24. Algeria (DZA) 51. Korea, Rp. (KOR) 78. Russia (RUS)
25. Ecuador (ECU) 52. Sri Lanka (LKA) 79. Saudi Arab. (SAU)
26. Egypt (EGY) 53. Lithuania (LTU) 80. Sudan (SDN)
27. Spain (ESP) 54. Latvia (LVA) 81. Senegal (SEN)
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1.   Distance weighting according to exp(-9 distanceij))
2.  To try and identify the channels through which technical knowledge is transmitted Keller
investigates not just distance between countries, but also the volume of trade between them,
their bilateral FDI holdings, and their language skills (the share of the population in country i
that speaks the language of country j).  Adding these variables renders simple geographical
distance insignificant; around two-thirds of the difference in bilateral technology diffusion is
accounted for by trade patterns, and one sixth each through FDI and language.  However, all
these variables are themselves declining with distance.
3.  Of course, there are many intermediate goods, but here we summarise their prices in a
single price index, q.
4.  This is a trade cost factor, thus t = 1.2 means that trade costs are 20% of the value of goods
shipped.
5.  We assume that technologies are the same in all countries – geography is the only source
of difference between countries.
6.  They also derive the wage equation and the market access and supplier access from
economic fundamentals, based on Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999).
7.  The list of countries is given in the appendix.  A similar pattern is observed using data on
manufacturing wages per worker.  See Redding and Venables (2000) for further details.
8.  For example, Gallup and Sachs (1999).  We only use variables that can be reasonably
regarded as exogenous, so do not have, for example, measures of countries’ human or
physical capital stocks.
9.  Cairncross (2001) p113.
10.  A good example of outsourcing is Nortel Networks, a Canadian company that specialises
in high-performance communications networks.  In 1998 it sold off its production plants to
separate companies with whom it now has long term contracts, in order to concentrate on
production of the most sophisticated components and on network installation (Cairncross
2001 p150).
11.  British Airways expects to reduce the number of suppliers from 14000 to around 2000 as
it implements on-line procurement.  (Cairncross 2001 p138).
12.  See Holmstrom and Roberts (1998) and Gibbons (1998) for surveys of these two areas.
13.  The curve is concave, although not strictly concave everywhere.
Notes:
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Figure 1: Trade costs and wages
t
Intermediates 50%
country 1 costs
Wages
relative to
central
wages
No intermediates
Intermediates 25%
country 1 costs
Figure 2 : GDP per capita and FMA
l
n
G
D
P
p
e
r
c
a
p
i
t
a
(
U
S
d
o
l
l
a
r
s
)
ln FMA
12.4915 17.9726
6.1569
10.2581
ALB
ARG
ARM
AUS AUT
BGD
BGR
BLX
BOL
BRA
CAF
CAN
CHE
CHL
CHN
CIVCMR
COG
COLCRI
CZE
GER DNK
DZA
ECUEGY
ESP
EST
ETH
FIN FRA
GAB
GBR
GRC
GTM
HKG
HND
HRV
HUN
IDN
IND
IRLISR
ITA
JAM JOR
JPN
KAZ
KEN
KGZ
KOR
LKA
LTU
LVA
MAR
MDA
MDG
MEX
MKD
MNG
MOZ
MUS
MWI
MYS
NIC
NLD
NOR
NPL
NZL
PAK
PAN
PER
PHL
POL
PRT
PRY
ROMRUS
SAU
SDNSEN
SGP
SLV
SVK
SVN
SWE
SYR
TCD
THA
TTO
TUN
TUR
TWN
TZA
URY
USA
VEN
YEM
ZAF
ZMB
ZWE
Figure 3: Transportation versus Communication Costs, 1940-1990
source: Baldwin and Martin (1999)
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Figure 4: The cost of delay
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Figure 5: Iso-time lines
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Figure 6: Trade costs and real wages
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